Vitalii Borymski is a Researcher at the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and a winner of the Jerzy Giedroyc Prize for the best dissertation (2016) and the Ludwik Krzyzanowski Award for the best article of the year in The Polish Review (2023).
One of the most significant geopolitical changes in Central and Eastern Europe during the twentieth century was in the quality of Polish-Ukrainian relations. When the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) fought against Soviet Russia for its independence in 1917-1921, there was no consensus in Polish public opinion as to what position Warsaw should take. The National Democrats, led by Roman Dmowski, advocated the division of Ukraine (and Belarus) between Poland and Russia, believing that this would allow Poland to be large and strong enough to be a serious player in the region. By contrast, the Socialists, led by Józef Piłsudski, believed that the existence of an independent Ukraine was the only thing that could protect Poland from Russian expansionism. Helping Ukraine in its struggle for survival was the cornerstone of this concept.
In April 1920, an agreement was signed between the Ukrainian and Polish governments, according to which Poland undertook to help the UPR liberate a portion of Ukrainian territory from Bolshevik Russia. However, Piłsudski’s notion failed. The Polish-Soviet war eventually ended in the signing of the Treaty of Riga, which corresponded instead to the Polish National Democrats’ concept. According to this treaty’s terms, Ukraine and Belarus were to be divided between Poland and Russia. Over the subsequent two decades, Polish-Ukrainian relations could be described as very poor.
First the military and political catastrophe of Poland in 1939, and then the results of the Second World War, after which Poland found itself in the Soviet sphere of influence, became an impetus for rethinking Eastern policy. The relevant leadership was comprised of Polish émigré intellectuals, in particular the milieu of the Paris-based journal Kultura led by Jerzy Giedroyc. However, these ideas might have remained only theoretical had they not been picked up by the democratic opposition in the Polish People’s Republic (PPR).
In some sense, the history of democratic opposition in the PPR was a prologue to Polish politics after 1989. One of the basic forms of dissident activity across the socialist Eastern Bloc was the publication of underground periodicals, or samizdat. Among socialist countries, only the Polish opposition managed to reach a wide range of social circles. The ideological palette of the Polish opposition was not homogeneous. Nevertheless, as the prominent oppositionist Jacek Kuroń has emphasized, all political groups in Poland, left-wing or right-wing, had similar programs, the main goal of which was to restore Polish sovereignty.
Historical topics were often discussed in those books and journals published despite censorship. Piłsudski’s Eastern policy was one of the most popular topics in these publications, as the events of 1920 were considered a point of bifurcation in recent Polish history. The intellectual atmosphere was predominated by a belief in the far-sightedness and prudence of Piłsudski’s concept, while that of the National Democrats was often criticized. For example, the prominent intellectual Andrzej Ostoja-Owsiany stated: “Today, from the perspective of historical events and misfortunes that have hit Poland, we can clearly see how correct the idea of the Marshal was.”
Wojciech Roszkowski, the author of the most popular underground publication on the history of Poland, expressed regret at the failure to implement Piłsudski’s plans, as he regarded his concept as “the best defense against Russian possessiveness.” One of the conclusions that Roszkowski drew was that only the independent existence of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania could guarantee Poland’s independence in the long term. Another influential intellectual, Ryszard Zieliński, believed that the catastrophe of war that befell Poland in 1939 was the result of the events of 1920. He considered the main reason for this to be the fact that the Ukrainian and Polish societies could not unite at that time due to bilateral prejudices. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion that “our chance is still ahead of us.”
Some oppositionists, such as Jerzy Łojek, had “no doubt” that Poland’s loss of sovereignty could have been avoided had Piłsudski’s concept been successfully implemented. Jerzy Targalski, too, believed that, in that scenario, communism would not have been able to extend beyond ethnic Russia and threaten the world. He considered the conclusion of peace with the Bolsheviks in Riga a mistake that became the main reason for Poland’s loss of independence first in 1939, and later in 1944. According to Bohdan Skaradziński, one of the most distinguished Polish intellectuals of the time, Piłsudski’s Eastern policy was far from an ideal experience of cooperation because Poles sometimes treated Ukrainians with contempt. His main conclusion was that Polish-Ukrainian cooperation should be built on an equal basis. Only then would it be effective and successful.
This view of history pervaded Polish underground publications. From this perspective, it logically followed that Poland’s main hope lay in the national movements of the non-Soviet republics of the USSR, mainly Ukraine. This opinion was conveyed clearly by Stanislaw Rojek: “The key to the real independence of Poland lies in the hands of our Polish neighbors incorporated into Soviet Russia. It does not lie in Moscow, because the invader will never give up his imperial status.”
From a historiosophical perspective, these ideas passed into applied politics. Reconciliation and cooperation were indicated as essential conditions for regaining freedom. For example, the Lublin-based journal Spotkania declared its support for the independence of all the peoples of the USSR, especially Ukrainians. In the program text published in the first issue, Janusz Krupski wrote: “Without liberating the nations of the Soviet Union, we will not regain nor maintain our independence.”
An article by the influential oppositionists Jacek Kuroń, Antoni Macierewicz, and Adam Michnik laid the ideological foundations of this attitude toward Polish Eastern policy. The authors noted that Poland, along with Soviet Russia, participated in dividing Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania in the interwar period, and therefore pursued an imperialist policy toward these peoples. Such a strategy led to the catastrophe of 1939. Poland should not treat these territories as a sphere of influence, as it would not be able to compete with Russia. They considered the sovereignty of these nations to be a guarantee of Poland’s own independence.
In 1984, several opposition organizations—including the Wolność-Sprawiedliwość-Niepodległość (Freedom-Justice-Independence) and Wyzwolenie (Liberation) parties, the Liberal Democratic Party Niepodległość (Independence), the Wola (The Will) political group, and the publishing house In Corpore—issued a statement titled To our Brothers the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians, which expressed support for these nations’ independence and was published in various periodicals. Furthermore, the Resolution on the Right of Ukraine to Independent State Existence, which was adopted by the Political Council of the Confederation of Independent Poland and timed with the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Ukrainian Treaty, stated: “Poland’s interests are the unconditional formation and strengthening of a completely independent Ukrainian state, which would occupy the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians.” In 1988, several Polish and Ukrainian political organizations declared Polish-Ukrainian cooperation “a vital necessity.”
Eventually, the phrase “There is no independent Poland without independent Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania” became the slogan of the Polish opposition activists’ Eastern policy. Such changes in the intellectual landscape of Polish-Ukrainian relations became a response to Russian expansionism. From 1989 until the present day, this concept remains the basis of Poland’s Eastern policy.
