This post was a Judges' Choice winner in the Jordan Center Blog's fourth annual Graduate Student Essay Competition.
Ian Cameron is a recent graduate of George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs with an MA in European and Eurasian Studies.
In 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the inaugural Eastern Economic Forum. In his address, he unveiled a policy of “fast track” development in Russia’s Far East and a “strengthening of relations” with Asia-Pacific countries as Russia’s answer to Asia’s increasing economic strength. Given the collapse of Moscow’s relations with Europe and the United States since 2022, as well as the strength of Russia’s partnership with Beijing, the stage is seemingly set for Russia to fully realize this pivot towards Asia. However, somewhat paradoxically, Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine has likely doomed any prospects of such a pivot.
After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, some European countries were hesitant to punish it, still seeing the potential for cooperation with Putin’s regime. This is no longer the case, even in capitals like Paris and Berlin. Since 24 February 2022, the coalition of states supporting Kyiv has launched an unprecedented campaign of economic pressure against Russia. Across Europe, leaders agree that the West’s relationship with Russia cannot return to the status quo ante bellum.
Russia’s aggression has also likely severed the most enduring element of the economic linkage between Russia and Europe: energy. Russia’s status as Europe’s primary energy provider stretches back decades, with countries like Germany relying on cheap Russian gas. However, in a very short time, Europe has mostly weaned itself off Russian fossil fuels, and as the continent focuses on the green transition, it is unlikely to look back.
This fundamental rupture between Russia and Europe seemingly offers ideal conditions for Moscow to look eastward, and the Kremlin still seems to believe that a pivot to Asia is possible. Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept emphasizes Moscow’s relationships with the Global South as a whole and with the Asia-Pacific region in particular, and Putin frequently elevates Russia’s status as a unique “state-civilization” that is as Asian as it is European. Despite these efforts, Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has almost certainly prevented a political and economic turn toward Asia.
One obstacle is the problem of the Russian Far East. Although Russia’s regions in Asia compose the vast majority of its territory, they are underpopulated and underdeveloped, conditions that Moscow would have to correct in order to shift away from Europe and toward Asia. The Kremlin recognizes this problem, leading to Putin’s initiatives both in 2015 and in previous years to accelerate the Far East’s development. However, even before 2022, those initiatives had largely stalled. The development of the Far East has been further complicated by pervasive corruption in Russia’s economy and government.
The war in Ukraine has intensified the challenges involved in developing the Far East. Russia’s exclusion from the global banking system and the impact of the comprehensive sanctions campaign make attracting outside investment (a key goal of past initiatives) almost impossible. Without foreign investment, Moscow would have to finance investment and development from its own pocket, which is unlikely to happen given Russia’s limited financial means. The war has placed Russia under significant financial pressure, with the military absorbing increasingly large amounts of the Russian budget. These challenges also extend to energy projects in areas like the Arctic coast, which look unviable without access to Western expertise and technology.
Second, the Kremlin’s potential eastward turn faces major geopolitical and diplomatic challenges that ultimately also stem from Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Russia’s relations with Tokyo and Seoul, both part of the sanctions coalition against Russia, have suffered significant damage in the last two years. A chilling effect is especially obvious in regard to South Korea, given that Moscow’s engagement with North Korea has sharply increased, to the point that Russia may be trading military technology to Pyongyang in exchange for munitions and missiles.
Russia’s need for military equipment ties into yet another problem related to the war in Ukraine: arms exports. Historically, arms exports have been a key diplomatic tool for Russia, and many of Moscow’s largest clients have been in Asia. However, Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine has undermined confidence in Russian arms, while Russia’s own acute demand for weapons has harmed its ability to honor export contracts. While Russia’s status as an arms exporter was already slipping before 2022, the war in Ukraine has exacerbated the downward trend.
Beyond changes in specific relationships or tools, Russia’s image as an international rule breaker further undermines the Kremlin’s ambitions. Russia lacks a long history of diplomatic engagement with much of Asia and would be a smaller, more marginal player. It is unclear whether the Kremlin could accept that role given Russia’s self-identification as a “great power” deserving respect. Moreover, Russia would need to recast itself as a “good regional citizen” with a constructive vision, which runs directly counter to Moscow’s ingrained instincts.
Moscow’s partnership with Beijing further complicates both the economic and geopolitical challenges facing Russia. Despite Putin’s description of “no-limits” cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, the war in Ukraine has revealed hard limits on how far Beijing is willing to go in support of its partner.
Although Beijing has supported Moscow’s war effort through limited weapons deliveries, and by providing sanctioned technologies, that support is minor compared to what Ukraine’s supporters have given to Kyiv. Overall, Beijing’s limited support did not meet Moscow’s expectations about the depth of their partnership. Moreover, although China has helped absorb energy exports that Moscow has had to redirect from Europe, Beijing has enjoyed sizable discounts on those purchases.
Indeed, in the economic sphere, Beijing has always prioritized its own interests over helping its “partner,” as demonstrated by the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a project that the Kremlin has been promoting for years. Beijing has continually refused to finalize a deal, seemingly content to wait until Russia becomes more desperate and offers better concessions. Moreover, while China has engaged with Russia on energy projects, in most other areas Chinese businesses have balked in the face of Russia’s corruption.
The perception that Moscow is dependent on Beijing for support in its war on Ukraine damages Russia’s relations with countries wary of Beijing. For example, Moscow has traditionally maintained close ties with India, balancing its connections with both New Delhi and Beijing, but that balancing act has become more difficult as Russia’s ties to China have deepened.
None of the above means that Russia has no prospects for increasing its economic and diplomatic engagement with Asia. The Sino-Russian partnership remains strong, and in some ways it has even been strengthened by the war in Ukraine. Russia is likely to expand its gas business in Asia, while many influential Asian states have shown themselves mostly unconcerned with the invasion of Ukraine.
However, there are considerable limits to what Moscow can achieve in the Asia-Pacific, and those limits doom any ambitions of a complete pivot to Asia. This fact, in turn, has important ramifications for Russia’s relationship with Europe. Despite Moscow’s best efforts, Russia will likely remain primarily a European power rather than an Asian one. At the same time, Europe will need to develop a strategy for dealing with Russia in the long term, both as its primary security threat and as an unavoidable player in regional politics.
