Vivien Horvath is completing her BA Honours in Political Science alongside a Major in History at Concordia University in Montreal. Her research interests include right-wing political rhetoric and illiberalism in Hungary.
Hungary is in the midst of one of its most heated electoral campaign periods since the country democratized in 1990. For the first time since Viktor Orbán became Prime Minister in 2010, a viable opposition candidate is challenging the two-thirds parliamentary majority held by the ruling Fidesz party. This supermajority allowed Orbán and his party to effectively position themselves above the law and consolidate power over the past four terms—so much so that the European Parliament deems the country a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.”
The parliamentary contest, scheduled for 12 April 2026, could become this year’s most consequential European election. Against the background of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the Hungarian campaign resembles a hybrid political battleground in which geopolitical tensions and domestic electoral competition intersect.
A two-thirds majority vote in parliament is needed to pass legislation in Hungary, including making amendments to the constitution. Since taking power, Fidesz has disempowered the higher courts; implemented a new constitution; reformed the electoral system; and taken control of most of the country’s media outlets. In short, Fidesz’s supermajority allows it to rule virtually unchecked.
Under Orbán’s leadership, Hungary’s government is increasingly at odds with the European Union. On the issue of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Budapest has repeatedly vetoed EU initiatives including sanctions against Russia and aid to Kyiv. For over a decade, Orbán has framed his government as the protector of Hungarian sovereignty against antagonistically framed outgroups like “Brussels.” This campaign period has, accordingly, produced heightened rhetoric against both the European Union and Ukraine.
Meanwhile, diplomatic tensions between Hungary and Ukraine have been intensifying, affecting the campaign environment. In late January, a Russian drone strike caused a fire at the Brody oil hub in Western Ukraine, stopping oil shipments to Hungary from Russia through the Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline. Since Hungary receives 92 percent of its crude oil through this route, the supply disruption was immediately reflected in the government’s rhetoric. Fidesz and Orbán have accused Ukraine of delaying repairs and capitalizing on the disruption for political leverage. As of late February, Orbán has deployed soldiers near key Hungarian energy facilities to strengthen what it deems critical energy infrastructure and, as he put it, “to repel potential attacks.” Orbán has since threatened to stop gas deliveries to Ukraine if oil flows are not resumed.
Relations with Ukraine further deteriorated on 6 March, when Hungary’s Counter-Terrorism Center (TEK) intercepted a routine cash-transport vehicle belonging to Ukraine’s Oschadbank, a state savings bank. Citing suspicions of money laundering, Hungarian authorities detained seven Ukrainian bank employees and seized approximately $80m worth of cash and nine kilograms of gold. In response, Ukraine’s foreign minister accused the Hungarian government of state banditry and hostage-taking. Although the bank employees were later released, the fate of the seized assets remains unclear at the time of writing.
In reaction to this series of escalations, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has adopted a toughened rhetoric toward Hungary. In what appeared to be a veiled threat directed at Orbán, he suggested that Ukrainian soldiers could be given the address of a “certain person” so they could speak with him “in his own language.” Threats like these, though they may appeal to Zelenskyy’s chosen audiences, play into Orbán’s hand. Convincing the electorate that Hungary is in imminent danger increases the likelihood of a fifth consecutive victory for Fidesz.
Apparently operating with this strategy in mind, the Hungarian government has recently accused Ukraine of meddling in the country’s elections. Orbán claimed on 11 March that Ukraine had threatened to attack him and his family—seemingly in response to remarks by Hryhoriy Omelchenko, a retired Ukrainian politician and a marginal figure known for making outlandish claims. This tit-for-tat became the latest move in Fidesz’s longstanding playbook of maintaining support by portraying external actors as existential threats to Hungarian safety and sovereignty.
Within this narrative universe, the ruling party has positioned its main opposition challenger, Péter Magyar, as a proxy for perceived foreign interest. Government officials have repeatedly accused Magyar—whose name literally means “Hungarian”— and his party, Tisza, of acting on behalf of both the European Union and Ukraine. According to government-sponsored messaging, Magyar and Tisza intend to align Hungary with what it calls “the pro-war lobby” in Brussels, with the ultimate aim of dragging the country into war.
These narratives are communicated and amplified by the media, over 80% of which has been under government control since 2018. Fidesz’s fearmongering appears in television and radio coverage; on billboards and posters scattered across the country; and even in a comic book vilifying Magyar that is sold across Hungarian bookstores at a discounted price.
Magyar rejects the allegations, framing Tisza instead as “the real party for peace.” A former high-ranking Fidesz party member himself, Magyar emerged as a national political figure in early 2024 after publicly breaking with Orbán and his party. This break occurred in the aftermath of the resignation of Justice Minister Judit Varga—his former spouse—amid a child abuse-related clemency scandal. Since that time, Magyar has worked to position himself as both a nationalist reformer and an anti-corruption candidate capable of overthrowing the Orbán-regime.
Anticipating a series of aggressive smear campaigns, Magyar has sought to get ahead of incoming attacks to soften their blow. Recently, he accused Russia of lending support to Orbán’s campaign through disinformation videos circulated online. Lending credibility to Magyar’s claims, several European national security sources have warned that the Kremlin has sent political technologists to interfere with the elections. It has also been found that Péter Szijjártó, Hungary’s Foreign Minister, regularly provided Sergei Lavrov, his Russian counterpart, with reports on the matters being discussed at EU meetings.
Hungarian rights groups have voiced concerns over potential disruptions. Specifically, they have expressed concern with the appointment of Putin’s former interpreter, Daria Boyarskaya, to a key role in monitoring the Hungarian elections. According to reports from a European intelligence service, Russian operatives have also allegedly proposed staging an assassination attempt against Orbán to influence public opinion in a strategy they called “the Gamechanger,”
Despite significant public support for Tisza, the structure of the Hungarian electoral system makes the upcoming election an uphill battle for Magyar. Fidesz has introduced several changes to electoral rules over the past four terms, creating a situation in which the opposition would need to exceed the incumbent’s vote share by 3 to 5 percent of the national vote to secure a majority in parliament. Although Tisza has been consistently polling around 10 percentage points above Fidesz since mid-2025, such an advantage does not necessarily translate into a guaranteed victory for Magyar due to the uneven electoral playing field Fidesz has created.
Even if Tisza wins, regional and global observers should not expect dramatic changes in foreign policy. True, Magyar has been running on a campaign that promises “regime change,” institutional reform, and the restoration of trust with the European Union and NATO. However, his plan to restore rule of law is framed primarily as a key to unlocking frozen EU funds. Regarding Ukraine, he has repeatedly stated that he would not reverse Hungary’s current policy of non-support.
Domestically, dismantling Fidesz’s entrenched system of influence would prove similarly difficult. After a decade and a half in power, the party retains significant control over public institutions, regulatory bodies, courts, and the media landscape. Without a two-thirds parliamentary majority—which currently appears unlikely for either party—the incoming government will be constrained in its ability to enact sweeping reforms, as the parliamentary system of checks and balances would regain effect. Nonetheless, for the first time in 16 years, the outcome of this election is not immediately obvious. This fact, in itself, can be understood as a marker of change that is hopefully to come.
